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ABSTRACT
Much remains to be done before agricultural trade is as liberal as world trade
in manufactures. But agriculture is distorted by more than agricultural policies. In
developing countries especially, farming is discouraged not only by farm protection
policies in high-income countries but also by those countries' own manufacturing
policies and distortions to services markets. This paper explores the extent to which
multilateral liberalization of not only farm but also non-farm policies would affect
welfare and the markets for farm products. It projects the global economy to 2005,
when the Uruguay Round (UR) implementation will be complete, and assesses the
potential impact of further cuts from that post-UR base. This is done using a modified
version of the GTAP model of global trade, assuming 40% cuts in protection in
agriculture, mining and manufacturing, and services. Results suggest agricultural and
industrial liberalizations could yield similar-sized benefits for the global economy in
2005. However, the distributions of gains from those cuts are quite different as
between rich and poor countries. We also examine the interaction between non-
agricultural reforms and agricultural trade balances. For some regions, most notably
for China, non-agricultural reforms dominate and reverse the sign of the change in the
food trade balance following liberalization of both farm and non-farm trade. This
suggests policy makers concerned with food and agriculture need to give attention
also to non-agricultural policy reforms.
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NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Until the Uruguay Round, agricultural trade policies were subject to few
multilateral disciplines. In this situation, the interplay of special-interest pressures has
resulted in this sector becoming heavily distorted. In 1995, the average rate of
protection faced by developing countries on their exports of agricultural products was
16.4 percent, more than twice the average rate of protection they faced on their
exports of manufactures. On their exports to industrial countries, the average tariff
they faced was 15.1 percent, close to five times as high as the tariff on their exports of
manufactures to these countries.
Through the eight rounds of multilateral liberalization since 1947, the average
tariff rates imposed on industrial products in the high income countries have fallen
from over 40 percent to around 1.5 percent. By contrast, until the Uruguay Round,
there were no effective international rules to discipline agricultural protection, and
rates of protection, if anything, increased. Even after the Uruguay Round, agricultural
support policies remain loosely disciplined—according to the OECD, the average rate
of agricultural protection on bulk agricultural commodities in the OECD countries
rose from 32 percent to 37 percent between 1997 and 1998.
In part because of the barriers to market access that they face, developing
countries have been reducing their reliance on agricultural exports. The share of
agriculture in developing country merchandise exports has fallen from close to a half
in 1965 to just over 10 percent in 1995, and is projected to fall further by 2005. (Part
of the reason for this projected decline is the absence of substantial cuts in applied
protection by the OECD countries under the Uruguay Round.) Within these
agricultural exports, developing countries remain much more reliant on exports of
bulk commodities than do the industrial countries. In 1995, developing countries
accounted for 44 percent of global exports of bulk agricultural commodities, but only
23 percent of non-bulk agricultural commodity exports. This reliance on exports of
bulk commodity exports locks developing countries into a declining share of world
markets for agricultural commodities. Since 1965, the share of bulk commodities in
world agricultural trade has fallen from 70 percent to around 45 percent.
Agriculture remains much more important in the economies of developing
countries than it does in the high-income countries. Developing countries remain
small net exporters of agricultural commodities. Further, consumers in developing
countries spend over 30 percent of their incomes on food—almost three times the
share in industrial countries—making them much more vulnerable to shocks.
Agriculture’s contribution to GDP in developing countries, at 16 percent, is also
around three times as high as its share in industrial countries.
Before performing the analysis of potential trade liberalization, we project the
changes in the structure of the world economy from the initial database period, 1995,
to 2005, by which time all of the Uruguay Round liberalization will have been phased
in. Over this period, the share of manufactures exports from developing countries is
projected to rise further, as the tariff cuts agreed in the Uruguay Round are phased in,
while the openness of the agricultural sector tends to decline.
A 40 percent reduction in agricultural tariffs, export and production subsidies
results in global welfare gains of around $70 billion per year. The largest dollar
amounts of gain, and the largest gains as a share of agricultural value added accrue to
developed countries. However, the gains relative to GDP are largest in developing
country regions such as (non-India) South Asia and (non-Indonesia) Southeast Asia.
Impacts of this liberalization on agricultural trade volumes are mixed—while
reducing tariffs tends to increase import volumes, reductions in production and export
subsidies tend to reduce volumes. If production subsidies are excluded from the cuts,
the global gains decline to $60 billion per year, but trade volumes grow relatively
more, and net food importers in regions such as the Middle East and North Africa,
South Asia and China are relatively better off.
The gains from a 40 percent liberalization of manufactures trade are about the
same order of magnitude as those from agricultural liberalization, despite the fact that
agriculture is a much smaller percentage of global output than manufactures. The
developing countries receive the lion’s share of the manufacturing liberalization gains
because they face higher rates of protection on manufactures exports, and because
liberalization lowers the efficiency costs imposed by their own protection.
Liberalization of trade in manufactures and services has powerful impacts on
agricultural trade through economy-wide linkages in each economy. Reductions in
countries’ own-protection to these non-agricultural sectors will affect agricultural
exports through four major channels: (1) it lowers the cost of intermediate inputs in
food production, (2) it tends to increase the availability of labor and capital for food
production, (3) it encourages consumers to substitute away from agricultural products
towards now-cheaper manufacturing and services goods, and (4) in the absence of
increased net capital inflows, it gives rise to a real depreciation in the liberalization
region. All of these forces tend to lead to an improvement in the food trade balance,
and this is predicted to be the dominant force in the high-income countries.
Of course, increases in a country’s market access to other countries’ markets
for industrial products and services will tend to work in the opposite direction, leading
to higher-priced intermediates, more costly labor and capital, consumer substitution
towards food products and a real appreciation. Thus we observe that multilateral
liberalization leads to deterioration in the food trade balance in the developing
countries of East and Southeast Asia, including China.
Overall, the combined effect of multilateral trade liberalization of agriculture
and non-agricultural trade in 2005 is projected to lead to an increase in the food trade
balances for most developing country regions, with the notable exceptions of India,
China and the Middle East/North Africa region. The heavily protected markets of
Western Europe and Japan experience the largest deterioration in their food trade
balance under this WTO2000 scenario.
Agriculture and Non-agricultural Liberalization in
the Millennium Round
I. Introduction
Prior to the 1980s agriculture was largely left undisciplined by the GATT (Josling,
Tangemann and Warley 1996). One of the great achievements of the Uruguay Round of trade
negotiations was the bringing of agricultural policies under much greater multilateral discipline.
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture led to the conversion of non-tariff agricultural
import barriers into bound tariffs, and those bound tariffs, together with subsidies to farm
production and exports, have been scheduled for phased reductions between 1995 and 2000 (or
up to 2004 in the case of developing countries). This represents a major reversal of the trend
since the 1950s of substantial growth in agricultural protection and insulation in the advanced
industrial economies, and its subsequently spread to a number of newly industrializing
economies (Johnson 1973; Anderson and Hayami 1986; Tyers and Anderson 1992). More than
that, the Agreement on Agriculture has altered the climate of farm policy making in both
advanced and developing countries. Even though Uruguay Round commitments themselves will
not result in large cuts in farm protection, attitudes have been irreversibly changed and the
foundation has been laid for further reforms, including during the next WTO Round.
Having said that, it needs to be recognized that little reduction in actual agricultural
protection rates will have occurred by the end of this decade, when barriers to trade in
agricultural products will still be several times higher than barriers to trade in manufactures.
Hence much remains to be done before agricultural trade is as liberal as world trade in
manufactures. A key purpose of the next WTO round of multilateral negotiations is therefore to
further reduce distortions to world food production, consumption and trade.
However, agriculture is distorted by more than agricultural policies. In developing
countries especially, farming is discouraged not only by farm protection policies in high-income
countries but also by those countries' own manufacturing policies and distortions to services
markets. Farm lobby groups in developing countries therefore have an interest not only in the
agricultural negotiations of the next WTO round, but also the non-agricultural ones. The purpose
of this paper is to explore the extent to which multilateral liberalization of not only farm but also
non-farm policies would affect the markets for farm products.
In the next section of this paper, we consider the patterns of production, consumption,
trade and protection, as well as other structural features of the global economy that are likely to
influence the welfare impacts of liberalizing agricultural and non-agricultural trade. We then turn
to projections of the global economy to the year 2005 when the Uruguay Round (UR)
implementation is complete. Our goal is to assess the potential impact of further cuts from this
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post-UR base. Then, in the fourth section, we discuss the simulations performed and the key
findings. The fifth section contains a summary and conclusions.
II. Patterns of consumption, production and trade
Agriculture is much more important for the developing countries than for the high
income economies of the OECD. This fact is true whether one looks at food’s share in
consumption or the share of food and agricultural production in GDP. Table 1 reports these
figures for nineteen regional groupings of the global economy (see appendix for definitions of
these groupings). Here, we see from the first column that the estimated share of food in private
consumption (at producer’s prices1) in 1995 was in excess of 40% in South Asia, China,
Indonesia and Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, the comparable share for OECD economies
(bottom of Table 1) was generally less than 15 percent. The fourth, fifth and sixth columns of
this table report the sectoral shares in economy-wide value-added across these economies. Here,
we again see the relative importance of food and agriculture in the developing countries. This
figure exceeds thirty percent in South Asia and much of Africa and it is above 20 percent in parts
of East Asia. In contrast, the relative importance of the food sector in GDP in the OECD
economies is only around 5 percent.
In light of the relatively greater importance of food and agriculture for the developing
countries’ economies, it is of considerable interest to examine what has been happening to
protection and trade in this sector in recent decades. Figure 1 reports the evolution of developing
countries’ aggregate merchandise export shares from the early 1960’s to the present (with
projections from 1995 to 2005 – see Section III below). The share of agriculture exports has been
on a path of continual decline over the entire period, falling from nearly half in 1965 to little
more than 10 percent today. Mining and minerals exports over this same period have been quite
volatile, reaching as high as fifty percent in the early 1980’s, before dropping off again with the
subsequent fall in energy prices. On the other hand, the share of manufactures in developing
country exports has been steadily climbing – from about one-quarter in 1965 to three-quarters of
merchandise exports today. Of course these averages mask considerable variation across
individual countries, as may be seen from the third group of columns in Table 1. These report
sectoral shares in total exports (both merchandise and services) for 1995. Food products’ share in
exports is highest (about one-quarter) for Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast,
food’s share of total trade is five percent or less in much of East Asia.
There are many factors influencing the evolution of developing countries’ export shares
over time. However, one of the most important has been the changing profile of protection in the
OECD economies – which absorb most of the world’s imports. Immediately following World
War II, average manufacturing tariffs in the OECD economies were about 40%. Today, they are
1.5%! This dramatic drop in the barriers to international trade in manufactures has contributed
strongly to the increased share of manufactures in world trade – for both developed and
developing economies (Hertel and Martin, 2000). It stands in sharp contrast with agriculture,
                                                
1 This means that wholesale, retail and transportation margins are not included. Compared to consumer expenditures
at consumer prices, the budget shares for physical products are too low, while the budget share for services is too
high.
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where the OECD’s nominal rate of assistance (this measure includes domestic support) has risen
from about 30 percent over the 1965-74 period to nearly 60 percent in 1998 (ABARE reference).
With agricultural protection rising, even as manufacturing tariffs have fallen, it is no wonder that
their relative shares in trade have moved so sharply in opposing directions.
While the share of food in total trade has been falling, this aggregate figure masks a very
significant development in the composition of global food trade – namely the shift from bulk
products (e.g., grains) to non-bulk products (e.g., meat products, fresh fruits and vegetables,
processed foods). This trend is clearly displayed in Figure 2, which shows both the evolution of
bulk vs. non-bulk shares in world trade, as well as developing country exports. From this, it is
clear that developing countries are relatively more reliant on the slow-growing, bulk food
product trade. However, the composition of their exports is following the global trend towards
non-bulk food exports. The latter have increased their share of total developing country food
exports from only 16% in 1965 to 42% in 1995 (Figure 2).
Another important aspect of developing country agriculture is their limited trade
exposure. The final two sets of columns in Table 1 report the share of exports in total production
and the share of imports in total domestic usage, for each regional grouping. On average, the
developing country ratio of exports to output for manufactures is three times as high as for food
products, and for some countries (e.g., China) this discrepancy is much larger. While the low
level of trade exposure for agriculture is partly due to the perishable nature of many food
products, an important contributor has also been the very high level of agricultural trade
protection around the world. Not surprisingly, a similar pattern exists for imports, expressed as a
share of total usage in each region. Manufactures exhibits the highest exposure to imports,
followed by food, and finally services.
The database underpinning the numbers in Table 1 is the version 4.0 GTAP database
(McDougall, et al., 1998). We have aggregated this up from the 45 region - 50 sector level at
which it is maintained, in order to facilitate our analysis (see appendix). It represents a snapshot
of the world economy in 1995, which is the first year of implementation for the Uruguay Round
(UR) agreement. For our analysis of the potential gains from agricultural and non-agricultural
liberalization in the next WTO round, we need to look ahead to 2005, when the UR agreement is
due to be fully implemented. Of course, there will be many other changes to the world economy
over this period, and some of these may affect the gains from a future WTO round. Therefore,
we employ a formal projections approach to establish a 2005 starting point for our subsequent
analysis. The next section details the underlying methodology and key assumptions.
III. Projections to 2005
Modeling Framework: We employ the widely used GTAP model of global trade (Hertel,
1997)2. This is a relatively standard, multi-region, applied general equilibrium model which
features explicit modeling of international transport margins, a global “bank” designed to
mediate between world savings and investment, and a relatively sophisticated, Constant
Difference of Elasticities (CDE) consumer demand system designed to capture differential price
                                                
2 The model is implemented using GEMPACK, (Harrison and Pearson, 1996).
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and income responsiveness across countries.  The latter is particularly important in the case of
projections work and this demand system is calibrated to existing estimates of income and own-
price elasticities, which are permitted to vary by region (McDougall, Dimaranan and Hertel,
1998). Of particular interest here are the income elasticities for disaggregated food demand, that
are taken from the World Food Model of the FAO (FAO, 1993).
Trade flows are modeled using the Armington (1969) approach, by which products are
differentiated by origin. They are assumed to substitute imperfectly for one another to form a
composite import aggregate. This, in turn, substitutes imperfectly for domestically produced
goods. In this way, the model is able to track bilateral trade flows. Validation efforts with the
GTAP model (Gehlhar, 1994, 1998; Coyle et al., 1998) show that it is able to track, to a
reasonable degree, some of the major changes in trade patterns over the past two decades.3
However, this work has also highlighted the key role of the trade elasticites. In particular,
Gehlhar (1997) finds that he obtains a better fit over his long run (one decade) period of analysis,
by increasing the size of these elasticities. Accordingly, it is now common practice to double the
size of the trade elasticities in long run projections work (Hertel, Martin, Dimaranan and
Yanagishima, 1997; Anderson et al., 1998; Hertel and Martin, 2000). However, this practice is
rather ad hoc and, until recently, it has not been formally validated.
The standard GTAP trade elasticities are reported in the first column of Table 2. They are
obtained from Jomini et al. (1991) who conducted a literature search in addition to performing
some of their own estimation work for New Zealand. These elasticities were designed to apply to
medium-run analyses. However, recent work by Liu et al. (2000) highlights the sensitivity of
these trade elasticities to the length of run involved in the simulation. Those authors formally
estimate the Armington parameters in the GTAP model for a 10x10 aggregation of the version 4
database. Their nine-year estimates of the elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic
goods are reported in the third column of Table 2.4 (The correspondence with commodity
definitions used in the current study is only approximate.) Comparing these estimates to the
entries in column one, we see that in most cases the standard GTAP parameters are too small
over the nine-year period. This contrast is particularly striking for processed food products,
where the Liu et al. (2000) estimate is nearly three times as large as the GTAP value.
The second column in Table 2 reports the elasticity of substitution between domestic and
imported goods used in the present study. As can be seen, these values have been obtained by
doubling the standard GTAP values. This adjustment brings us much closer to the recent
estimates by Liu et al. (2000) for farm and food products. However, it results in excessively high
trade elasticities for fuels and mining products, basic manufactures and autos, compared to the
Liu et al. estimates. Thus, for purposes of the present study of agricultural liberalization, the
higher trade elasticities would seem to be justified. However, it is possible that non-agricultural
trade flows will be excessively responsive to changes in protection.
                                                
3 Gehlhar's work showed that projections over a period of one decade were improved by increasing the size of the
trade elasticities. Accordingly, for this work, we have doubled the size of the standard GTAP trade elasticities
4 In this study, as well as in the Liu et al. (2000) work, the authors follow the rule of thumb developed by Jomini et
al. (1991) in setting the elasticity of substitution among imports from different sources equal to twice the value
of the elasticity of substitution between domestic good s and imports.
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Throughout the paper we employ the simplistic, but robust assumption of perfect
competition and constant returns to scale in production activities.5 While this is likely to be quite
appropriate for characterizing much of the world’s agricultural production, departures from
perfect competition are well-documented in the manufacturing sectors. How is this likely to bias
our results? Hertel (1994) explores the general equilibrium implications for agriculture of
potential “pro-competitive” effects of trade liberalization on manufacturing markups. He shows
that, by ignoring these effects, we are likely to overstate the amount of adjustment in agriculture
due to tariff reductions in non-agriculture, in the context of a small, open economy. Of course, in
the present, multi-region analysis these interactions become more complex. Nevertheless, it
should be borne in mind that, by ignoring the potential downward adjustment in manufacturing
markups in the presence of more intense foreign competition, we may be over-stating the impact
of developing country manufactures liberalization on agricultural output.
Following earlier projections work with the GTAP model (Gehlhar et al., 1994; Anderson
et al., 1997, Hertel et al., 1997), we assemble external projections for population, skilled and
unskilled labor, investment and capital stock. When combined with assumptions about likely
productivity growth rates, this permits us to predict the level and composition of GDP in 2005, as
well as trade flows, input usage, and a wide range of other variables. In addition, we obtain a
new equilibrium snapshot of the world economy in 2005 which will provide the starting point for
our subsequent WTO2000 simulations.
Overall rates of economic growth: Our forecasts for the fundamental drivers of global
economic change over the 1995-2005 period are reported in Table 3. These projections were
generated by combining historical and forecast data from the World Bank. Projections for
population and unskilled labor were obtained by cumulating the average growth rates between
1995 and the 2005. The skilled labor projections are based on forecasts of the growth in the stock
of tertiary educated labor in each developing country (Ahuja and Filmer, 1995) and projected
growth rates of skilled labor in developed countries from the World Bank They provide an
indication of changes in the stock of those qualified for employment as professional and
technical workers. Growth rates of physical capital were obtained from 1995 and the projected
2005 stock of physical capital. Projections of the stock of physical capital were calculated using
the Harberger-style, perpetual inventory method, that is, by adding investment net of
depreciation to update the capital stock in each year. Data for initial physical capital stock for
1995 as well as annual forecasts of gross domestic investment were obtained from the World
Bank.
Our projections of total factor productivity (TFP) growth vary by sector and region.
Regions are grouped into four categories according to their assumed rate of annual productivity
growth in manufactures. These range from low productivity growth (0.33%/year), to medium
(1%/year), and high (2%/year), with a final category -- very high (3%) reserved for China and
Taiwan. The latter two countries seem to be growing at rates that cannot be explained with
normal rates of productivity growth. Sectoral variation in productivity growth builds on the
econometric work of Bernard and Jones (1996). They find that the annual rate of productivity
                                                
5 Alternative versions of the GTAP model feature imperfect competition (Francois, 1998), but these are demanding
of additional information and unstable for projections purposes.
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growth over the 1970-87 period in OECD agriculture was about 40% faster than that of
manufacturing. Similarly, services TFP growth was about one-half that in manufacturing, while
they did not measure significant productivity growth in mining over this period. By combining
these factors of proportion (1.4, 0.5 and 0.0) with the above-mentioned manufacturing TFP
growth rates, we are able to obtain region/sector-specific productivity forecasts for the 1995-
2005 period.
A difficult aspect of constructing such projections has to do with the rate at which natural
resources are depleted -- or perhaps augmented through new discoveries. Rather than attempt to
estimate changes in the natural resource endowments over this period, we have simply opted to
target a particular rate of change in the prices of agricultural and other natural resource-based
commodities over the projections period. Grilli and Yang (1988) report an average rate of price
decline for metals in the 20th century of about 0.8%/year, while grains prices have fallen about
0.3%/year, on average. We allow the model to select a rate of farmland and natural resource
augmentation in agriculture and mining which achieves a continuation of these downward trends
in commodity prices throughout the 1995-2005 period.
In order to gauge the reasonableness of our projections, the last two columns in Table 3
compare our projected GDP growth rates over this period to those from the World Bank's
International Economic Analysis and Prospects Division. By and large they are quite close. This
is hardly surprising, since the two studies share many of the same basic assumptions. Significant
departures arise in the cases of the South Africa Customs Union, the Economies in Transition
(EIT) and Indonesia. In each case, our projected growth rates are substantially higher than the
World Bank's.  The only way the World Bank forecasts for these three regions could be achieved
in our framework is to have negative productivity growth rates, or substantial increases in
unemployment. We have opted not to do either of these, and so our forecasts are higher for these
three regions. Our forecast for China's GDP growth is slightly higher than that of the Bank,
however, the difference is negligible when viewed in terms of annual growth rates.
Assumptions about trade policy: Projected tariff rates for the year 2005 are reported in
Table 4. These are based on the 1995 rates taken from the GTAP version 4, and updated to take
account of anticipated changes owing to the Uruguay Round as well as China’s accession to the
WTO. 6 Consider first the agricultural tariffs. Here, it is important to note that the 1995 base year
represented a period of high world prices -- and therefore low measured protection. This is
because border protection for the OECD economies in 1995 was estimated using the OECD’s
Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) methodology. This involves observing the difference
between world and domestic prices and attributing that to the tariff-equivalent effect of national
trade policies. As a result, when world prices are high, measured protection tends to be low in
economies employing tariff rate quotas, variable tariffs and other tools for insulating their
domestic producers from world markets. In contrast to 1995, UR agricultural commitments were
made from a base period from the late 1980's when prices were very low and measured
protection was at an historic high. In light of these facts -- and in light of the extensive "dirty
                                                
6 In addition to the baseline shocks discussed here, it should be noted that several significant adjustments were made
to the levels of protection in the initial database, prior to conducting the baseline projections. These are detailed in
the appendix.
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tariffication" in agriculture (Hathaway and Ingco, 1995), (Ingco, 1996)), we believe that it is
sensible to assume that no further liberalization from 1995 levels is likely under the UR
Agreement.7 Accordingly, the tariffs reported in Table 4 are based on bilateral tariffs that are
identical to those in the version 4 database for 1995. (Because these tariff averages are trade-
weighted, and because intra-EU trade is not taxed, the EU average rate of protection is rather
misleading.) In addition to tariffs, we take explicit account of domestic support for agriculture,
again based on the OECD’s database. This is treated as an output subsidy, which is differentiated
by sector. To the extent that these support policies have been effectively decoupled from farmer
decisions, this treatment will overstate the production impact of lowering these subsidies under a
future WTO round.
For the developing countries these protection estimates are obtained from UNCTAD’s
TRAINS database. However, there are many country/commodity gaps and these are filled in
using the pre-UR estimates of Ingco (1996). Due to the presence of very high WTO bindings in
most developing countries, further reductions in agricultural protection are not likely to be
required under the UR. Of course, these projected tariffs for 2005 abstract from domestic reforms
that have been undertaken. For this reason, and because their current bindings are so much in
excess of applied tariffs, we must view our later estimates of developing country WTO2000
liberalization in agriculture as upper bounds.
In the manufacturing arena, the most important trade policy developments over the 1995-
2005 period are likely to be the completion of manufacturing tariff cuts under the Uruguay
Round, implementation of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC) and the accession of
China and Taiwan to the WTO. We have incorporated these changes by drawing on the work of
Francois and Strutt(1999) to specify the remaining UR cuts to be made from our 1995 base
period. China's WTO offer was obtained from the World Bank and is based on their offer as of
August, 1999. It is compared to their applied tariffs for 1997 and, where the bindings are lower,
the offer is taken as a change in policy. Otherwise, the 1997 applied rates are used. Our treatment
of Taiwan’s offer is based on their announced target of 4% average tariffs for manufactures. We
reduce all bilateral tariffs by an equi-proportionate amount sufficient to achieve this target in the
updated database. The resulting 2005 tariff averages for mining and manufacturing are reported
in the second and third columns of Table 4.
In moving to the 2005 database, we also take account of the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing. This is anticipated to have a large impact on trade as it implements accelerated growth
of quotas established under the previous, Multi-fiber Agreement, culminating in their abolition at
the end of the UR implementation period.  China and Taiwan, as non-members of the WTO,
remain constrained by the old, MFA quotas. Thus their accession brings important changes in the
textiles and apparel trade. While it is unlikely that their accession will culminate in the complete
elimination of China and Taiwan's clothing quotas by the year 2005, we believe that this will
follow soon after, and that it will be largely be complete before any cuts under a Millennium
                                                
7 Since China and Taiwan’s offers are not linked to the UR base year, it would make sense to include their
agricultural cuts in our baseline. However, we do not have solid estimates of their current protection rates and, at
least in China’s case, some of the bindings are clearly well-above current protection levels. Therefore, we do not
change their agricultural protection rates in the baseline simulation either.
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Round would take place. For this reason, we include their abolition in our baseline analysis as
well.
Thus far the discussion of protection has been entirely in terms of merchandise trade.
However, as noted in the introduction, services trade and investment is growing by leaps and
bounds, and international services transactions remain heavily protected in many countries. The
final four columns in Table 4 report estimates of the tariff equivalents of protection for the
construction services, business and finance, trade and transport and government services sectors
in the regions used for our analysis.  These are taken from Francois (1999) who estimates a
gravity model of services trade using bilateral services trade data from the United States.8 He
adopts Singapore and Hong Kong as free trade benchmarks and judges predicted imports from
the US relative to these economies. Discrepancies are attributed to protectionist policies and
tariff equivalents of these policies are obtained by assuming a constant elasticity of demand
function. While this approach is relatively simple, it results in some very reasonable estimates of
protection for the construction and business services sectors. Note from Table 4 that business and
construction services trade barriers do not appear to be systematically related to the level of
development. While India has the highest tariff equivalent in construction services, her business
services trade appears to be more open, controlling for income per capita and aggregate GDP,
than is the case for Japan. Protection for construction services in Japan is also quite high. It is
followed closely by Australia and New Zealand.
Unfortunately Francois’ estimates omit the trade and transport sectors, which comprise a
very large share of world services trade. For these sectors, as well as for government services, we
draw on the work of Hoekman (1995) developed for analysis of the Uruguay Round. These
protection measures are much cruder and rely on critical assumptions about the level of
prohibitive tariffs as well as the relationship between observed coverage ratios and the implied
tariff equivalent of protection for different sectors. 9 In light of the very limited specific
commitments made under the Uruguay Round’s services agreement, we assume that these levels
of protection will persist in 2005. As can be seen from the entries in Table 4, protection for
transport services (maritime, rail and air) is particularly high.
Structural Changes: 1995-2005: When the macro-economic shocks in Table 3 are
combined with the policy changes described above, we are able to simulate the model forward to
the year 2005. While the evolution of the economy over this period is not the central focus of this
paper, it is of interest to note a few of the major structural changes that occur. First of all, as a
consequence of the lack of progress in reducing agricultural support under the Uruguay Round,
agriculture’s share of developing country exports is projected to be even lower in 2005 (Figure
1). Meanwhile, the relative importance of manufactures is further accentuated by UR tariff cuts,
in conjunction with elimination of the textile and apparel quotas. This differential pattern of cuts
                                                
8 The dependent variable in this model is US exports, and the explanatory variables are the log of per capita income
and GDP. A dummy variable is used for exports from the US to Western Hemisphere nations.
9 The Hoekman protection estimates for the transport sector are quite high, while the protection estimates for
wholesale and retail trade are much lower. While the former sector is the dominant one from a trade in services
perspective, we seek to err in the direction of caution by cutting Hoekman’s transport estimates in half in order to
represent composite protection in the trade and transport sector of our model.
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also leads to increased openness (exports/output) for developing country manufactures and a
slight decline in agriculture’s openness in the developing countries.
IV. Analysis of WTO2000
Description of the Experiment: In this section we begin from the projected 2005 database
established based on the assumptions detailed in the previous section and proceed to analyze the
impact of post-Uruguay Round liberalization on economy-wide activity and welfare, as well as
changes in farm and food trade. Specifically, we consider across-the-board, 40% cuts in
estimated 2005 agriculture protection, services protection, as well as mining and manufacturing
tariffs. The depth of these cuts is slightly deeper than the one-third cuts agreed to in agriculture
and manufactures trade during the Uruguay Round, and it is very much in line with what was
being discussed at the time of this writing. More liberalization, and greater welfare gains, could
be achieved by cuts that go deeper, or which focus more on reducing peak tariffs. The estimates
presented in this paper are intended to provide a benchmark for comparing the differential impact
of agriculture and non-agriculture reforms on the global economy – and food trade in particular.
Modeling Protection: Our analysis of trade liberalization hinges importantly on the way in
which we model the effects of protection. In the case of manufactures, this is straight-forward,
since we are just focusing on cuts in ad valorem tariffs. These are simply reduced by 40%
across-the-board, for all sectors and regions. However, the situation is more complicated in
agriculture and services, therefore requiring additional discussion.
Despite attempts to increase transparency of farm and food protection under the Uruguay
Round, this has not yet been achieved. The introduction of tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on sensitive
commodities is a major source of non-transparency. These instruments are dealt with at length in
the papers by Abbott and Morse (1999) and Elbehri et al.(1999), also presented at this
conference, and they are not explicitly modeled here. Nor will we model specific tariffs which
remain widespread in agriculture, and which require supplementary data to properly evaluate.
Rather we will model the 40% cut in agricultural protection as one that achieves a 40% reduction
in the difference between the market price and the world price for all farm and food products. In
the case of TRQs, we will assume this comes about either through an expansion of the quota or a
reduction in the out-of-quota tariff, or perhaps a combination of the two. As Elbehri et al. (1999)
demonstrate, these different approaches to reform will have very different implications for the
distribution of quota rents, and hence welfare, between exporters and importers. Unfortunately
we cannot shed additional light on this topic and we will simply assume that, like tariff revenues,
all quota rents accrue to (and are lost by) importers.
A similar set of complications arises in the case of producer subsidies. Here, negotiators
seek to distinguish between coupled and de-coupled support. As is the case with TRQ’s, a proper
assessment of reform will require modeling each policy explicitly.  Furthermore, some would
argue that there is no such thing as a “de-coupled” farm support policy. Any payments made to
farmers will have the tendency to keep them in farming and thereby bolster production. Once
again, a comprehensive investigation of this issue is beyond the scope of the present study.
Rather, we will simply consider the consequences of a 40% reduction in the difference between
producer prices – inclusive of producer subsidies – and domestic market prices.
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This general approach to modeling reductions in agricultural support is also compatible
with the way in which the GTAP database has incorporated protection for farm and food
products. GTAP relies on price comparisons to assess the degree of border protection (market
price support), and on producer subsidies to construct producer prices. Since these measures of
protection are not instrument-specific, it makes sense to think of liberalization in the same,
summary fashion. In fact, since the version 4 database incorporates the domestic-world price
wedges on both the import and export sides, any reduction in support must logically reduce both
the import tariff and export subsidy equivalents at the same rate. This is the route that we take
here.
In the case of services protection the task is even more difficult. Here, since there is no
physical product being traded, the idea of modeling protection with revenue-raising, tariff
equivalents following the work of Brown et al. (1996) seems inappropriate. We assume instead
that barriers to services trade consume real resources on the part of firms attempting to access the
protected market. This limits the actual volume of services that can be delivered at a given cost.
Conversely, liberalization of restrictions on services trade can be viewed as augmenting the
amount of services delivered from a given level of export effort, thereby reducing the effective
price of services in the domestic market. We capture this phenomenon by introducing a services
import-augmenting technical change component into the model. We set the rate at which this
technical change occurs according to the tariff-equivalent estimates of Francois (1999) and
Hoekman (1995) as discussed above. For example, in the case of India’s imports of construction
services, Francois has estimated that prices must be 62% above their free trade level if one is to
explain the relatively low share of imports in this market. Therefore, in our 40% services trade
liberalization experiment, we will consider the impact of import-augmenting technical change
which reduces the effective price of construction imports to Indian firms by 40% of 62% =
24.8%. This approach is applied to all services sectors, with the goal of reducing measured
protection across-the-board by 40%.
Agricultural Liberalization: We turn first to the question of liberalizing agricultural trade
in a post-UR environment. As noted above, this involves 40% cuts in border protection as well
reductions in producer support. To aid in our analysis of results, Table 5 summarizes the global
averages for these estimated protection and support levels, by agricultural commodity in 2005.
Feedgrains top the list of protected commodities on a global basis. Here, very high rates of
protection on large volumes of feed grain imports into East Asia result in a global, average tariff
equivalent of 97 percent. This is followed by dairy, foodgrains, beverages and tobacco, and meat
products with average tariffs that are all in the neighborhood of 20% on a global basis. Average
protection for other food and agricultural products is much lower.
We can also examine protection from the exporters’ perspective, whereby the export subsidy
equivalents are aggregated across all regions and divided by exports at domestic market prices.
These are reported in the second column of Table 5. They show that, on a global basis, dairy
products are the most heavily subsidized exports, with total subsidy equivalents amounting to
27% of world trade (at domestic prices). This is followed by meat and livestock products (8%),
feedgrains (4%) and foodgrains (3%). The share of global oilseeds exports that are effectively
subsidized (market price in excess of world price) is too small to generate a measurable average
subsidy worldwide.
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When agricultural border price support is cut by 40% (AgrMkt40), a number of counter-
balancing forces are unleashed. First of all, reduced protection in the importing regions tends to
raise the demand for imported food products, thereby stimulating trade. However, reductions in
implicit subsidies on exports tends to reduce supply from some of the major exporting regions.
Thus the impact on world trade is ambiguous, as can be seen from the results in Table 6. Indeed,
for dairy products, the sizable cuts in export subsidies result in a decline in world dairy trade.
This decline is driven by a decline in subsidized EU dairy exports. The biggest increases in
global trade volume come in beverages and tobacco and other processed food products, where
initial protection is very high, and export subsidies do not play a role. World trade also increases
significantly for other processed food products, other agriculture, and meat and livestock
products.
Regional changes in food trade as a result of this 40% reduction in market price support are
most readily summarized in the form of changes in trade balances. In order to simplify the
analysis and accentuate the role of intersectoral competition, we have fixed the aggregated trade
balance for each region. Thus the sum of each region’s trade balance changes across all
commodities equals zero. Table 7 reports the changes in regional food trade balances owing to
the 40% reduction in border protection for agriculture. Western Europe shows the largest
absolute change in 2005, amounting to an increase of $23 billion in the value of imports, relative
to exports. This is followed by substantial increases in net food imports by Japan, China, the
Middle East and North Africa and India. It is hardly surprising to see North and South America,
and Australia/New Zealand as regions showing the largest increases in food trade balance. These
are natural net exporters. However, it is somewhat more surprising to see Taiwan and the other
NICs increasing their exports of food by more than they increase imports. This is a
compositional phenomenon whereby Taiwan, for example, increases its grain and oilseed
imports while exporting more livestock products. In the case of the other NICs, the increase is
driven by greater processed food, and beverages and tobacco exports. These exports are made
more competitive by the availability of cheaper raw materials.
It is also of interest to ask how simultaneous reductions in producer support might alter
these findings. Projected global average farm support levels for 2005, by commodity, are
reported in the third column of Table 5. From this, we can see that producer payments are
highest for the grains and oilseeds sectors. Average producer subsidies for meat and livestock
products, including dairy, are lower (2 – 3%). As noted above, these subsidies are treated as
output subsidies, thereby ignoring the recent proliferation of  “decoupled” support payments. We
consider the impact of a simultaneous cut of 40% in producer payments to farmers, modeled as a
reduction in output subsidies. To the extent that programs are partially decoupled, these
estimates will overstate the change in output as a result of the reduction in producer subsidies.
Future work will clearly need to refine this approach, by modeling domestic programs explicitly
on a country-by-country basis.
The second column in Tables 6 and 7 reports the changes in global export volume and
regional food trade balances owing to the 40% liberalization of both market and producer
support in food and agriculture (Agr40). Apart from Western Europe, where the change in food
trade balance drops by an additional 50%, the difference between this figure and the earlier one
(market price support only) is relatively modest. Furthermore, the same broad ordering is
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preserved. For the sake of completeness, we will proceed by reporting the welfare summary
results for both simulation experiments, but we will emphasize the simulation including domestic
support cuts. The reader may wish to view these two sets of results as upper and lower bounds on
the impact of a 40% liberalization package for the global food sector.
The real income impacts of these manufacturing tariff cuts are quite complex to analyze.
Welfare gains from such multilateral liberalization are fundamentally determined by two factors:
the change in the efficiency with which any given economy utilizes its resources, and changes in
a country's terms of trade (TOT).  We will begin by focusing on the efficiency gains. The first
column in Table 8 reports the efficiency gain in each region, as a share of food and agricultural
value-added, from the combined 40% reduction in market price and producer support. The
largest proportional gains are in Western Europe, followed by ROW, Japan, East and South Asia.
For example, in the case of Western Europe, Table 8 reports that the annual gains from this 40%
cut in support amount to more than 8% of the entire food sector’s value-added. This is a
substantial gain. At the other end of the spectrum, efficiency in the Australia/New Zealand
region actually falls slightly. This result is driven by a large increase in dairy exports for which
the domestic price exceeds the world price (an implicit subsidy). However, this decline in
efficiency does not mean that real income falls in that region, since we have not yet accounted
for the terms of trade effects.
Adding the terms of trade effects permits us to calculate the regional Equivalent Variation
(EV) – or the amount of money that could be taken away from consumers, at initial prices, while
leaving them at the same level of post-simulation utility. If the region in question experiences a
terms of trade improvement, i.e. export prices rise relative to import prices, then the EV gain will
be larger than the efficiency gain.  If the terms of trade deteriorate, then the opposite will be the
case. The second column in Table 8 reports the ratio of these two terms. Thus it may be seen that
India, with an Efficiency/EV ratio of 137%, experiences a terms of trade loss. In the case of
Other Southeast Asia, the two are virtually the same (101%) and we conclude that there is no
change in the terms of trade. Despite the small efficiency loss in ANZ, that region gains welfare
due to the rise in its export prices, relative to the price paid for imports. Latin America, including
Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North America are also terms of trade gainers, which makes
sense, given their net export positions in food products. The biggest terms of trade losses are
experienced by South Asia, China and the Middle East/North Africa region.
While it is useful to consider the size of these efficiency and welfare gains relative to the
size of the sector being liberalized, it is ultimately desirable to compare these gains with national
income – or better yet, relative to national expenditure. Recall from Table 1 that the share of
agriculture and food in overall GDP is largest for the South Asian economies and for Sub-
Saharan Africa (outside of South Africa). Thus, Other (non-India) South Asia looks like it will
be one of the biggest winners in this analysis, since the increase in efficiency per $ value-added
is high, as is the overall importance of this sector to the economy. On the other hand, the high
efficiency gain in Europe per $ value-added will be diluted by the fact that the food sector
represents only about 5% of GDP in that region. These points are confirmed by the third column
in Table 8 that reports the percentage of the EV relative to pre-WTO simulation, 2005
expenditure. Here the largest gains are generated in Other South Asia, followed by ROW and
Other (non-Indonesia) Southeast Asia, the Other NICs and then Western Europe.
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In order to compute the global welfare impacts of various liberalization experiments, we
report the regional EV’s in $ US millions in the second part of Table 8. Here we see that the
global welfare impact of the 40% cut in agricultural protection amounts to roughly $70 billion in
the year 2005 (“world” total in Table 8). This contrasts with the somewhat smaller gains ($60
billion) when producer subsidies are left off the table (AgrMkt40). Comparing the regional
impacts of these two simulations, we find that most regions are little changed, or even a bit better
off under the more comprehensive protection cut (most notably Australia/New Zealand, Western
Europe and Latin America). However, some regions benefit from leaving the producer support
unaltered (AgrMkt40). The Middle East and North Africa, in particular, have their terms of trade
losses diminished when only market price support is cut.
It should be noted that these welfare findings are quite sensitive to the size of the trade
elasticities that are used in the analysis. In this study, we have doubled the usual, medium term
elasticities to account for the longer term nature of our analysis (10+ years). In separate
simulations, we have cut these assumed values in half. This reduces the change in trade volumes
by 50% and consequently cuts the welfare gains in half as well. This rule of proportionality
works very well in predicting the effect of across-the-board changes in trade elasticities on global
welfare gains. However, by accentuating the regional terms of trade effects for regions engaging
in the deepest tariff cuts, the distribution of these smaller welfare gains across regions is altered
in favor of the regions making the smallest cuts in protection.
Non-agricultural Liberalization
We now turn to analysis of the impact of non-agricultural liberalization on trade in food
products. We focus here on the changes in regional food trade balances. There are four main
mechanisms through which these impacts are likely to be felt. The first is through reductions in
the cost of inputs for food and agriculture. Manufactures and services represent important inputs
to agriculture and food processing, particularly in the high-income economies. By lowering the
cost of imported, non-food inputs to agriculture, liberalization may have an important impact on
food production. A second mechanism through which non-agricultural liberalization can affect
agriculture is through the factor markets. If non-farm liberalization stimulates production of
manufactures, the cost of labor in farming will rise. Clearly this can work in the opposite
direction of the first mechanism – or it can reinforce it in those cases where manufactures
liberalization leads to an exodus of labor and capital from a non-competitive manufactures
sector. The third mechanism operates through consumers’ budget constraints. If non-agricultural
liberalization lowers the price of manufactures and services, consumers may substitute away
from food products. Finally, there is a direct interaction through the aggregate trade balance
constraint. When a country cuts its own manufacturing tariffs and increases imports, this opens
the possibility of other commodities – including agriculture – increasing net exports to fill the
resulting void.
Consider what happens when a country unilaterally cuts it non-agricultural protection. Since
we hold net capital inflows (outflows) constant, increased imports of non-food products must be
offset by increased exports of all products. Thus there must be a real depreciation in the region.
This translates into lower prices for labor and capital as well as for intermediate inputs, thereby
making it easier to export food products. In addition, the lower priced manufactures encourages
14
consumers to substitute away from food products, so domestic demand falls, thereby adding to
the export availability. On the other hand, if manufactures or services liberalization in other
regions results in increased exports, it may become harder for food producers to export. Thus it is
useful to consider what actually happens to the balance of trade for food products under
alternative liberalization scenarios.
The final two columns of Table 7 report the changes in aggregated food trade balances, by
region, under extraction and manufacturing liberalization, as well as a 40% cut in services
barriers. These results may be compared with the changes in food trade balances under
agricultural liberalization alone (first two columns) in order to assess the relative importance of
direct and indirect policies on a given region’s food trade. As noted earlier, Western Europe and
Japan show very strong deterioration in their food trade balance under agricultural liberalization.
The Americas, Australia and New Zealand offset these changes with increasing surpluses. In all
of these regions, the direct effect of agricultural liberalization on the food trade balance far
outweighs the indirect effect of non-agricultural liberalization. Therefore, it is more interesting to
focus on the developing countries in Asia and Africa.
Some regions show improvements in their food trade balance under agricultural
liberalization. This includes the Asian NICs (mentioned above) where lower priced raw materials
facilitate increased exports of processed food products, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe and
the FSU, and Southeast Asia. In the Asian economies, this is counteracted by a decline in the
food trade balance in the presence of manufacturing liberalization. This decline arises because
the 40% cut in manufacturing tariffs stimulates the demand for Asian exports of manufactures,
thereby drawing resources away from agriculture and food production. In Indonesia and Other
South Asia, the impact of manufacturing liberalization on the regional food trade balance
dominates the direct effect of agricultural liberalization, and the food trade balance declines as a
result of the combined 40% liberalization across all sectors. In the case of Other Southeast Asia,
the combination of manufactures and services liberalization overrides the direct effect of
agricultural liberalization and the food trade balance declines in the combined liberalization case.
In the case of the NICs, while the non-agricultural effect is strong, it is still dominated by the
direct effects of agricultural liberalization.
In China, Middle East and North Africa, India and ROW, food trade balances deteriorate
under agricultural liberalization. But in the Middle East and North Africa, the trade balances for
manufacturing and services deteriorate under non-agricultural liberalization and the combined
effect is a marginal increase in the food trade balance. In the case of China, as with the other East
Asian economies, manufacturing liberalization has a very strong negative effect on the food trade
balance, in this case reinforcing the direct effect. The combine outcome is a decline of about $6
billion in the annual food trade balance as of 2005.
The right-most columns in Table 8 report the regional welfare impacts of these non-
agricultural cuts on global real income in 2005. The global gains from 40% cuts in mining and
manufactures tariffs are very similar to those offered by agricultural reforms (roughly $70
billion). However, their distribution across regions is rather different, with relatively more of the
gains accruing to developing countries. The case of China is particularly striking. Her welfare
gains under Agr40 are quite small, $172 million. However, in the case of Emfc40, China’s
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welfare gains rise to more than $22 billion. In fact, with the sole exception of Sub-Saharan
Africa, all of the developing regions gain more under the manufactures cuts than they do under
agricultural liberalization.
The gains from services liberalization are much more speculative, given the difficulty of
measuring services protection discussed above. We have broken the services experiment into two
parts. The 40% cuts in business services and construction protection are based on the work of
Francois (1999) discussed above. It represents a considerable improvement over earlier attempts
to estimate the effects of services protection. These gains are relatively modest, given the still
limited trade in these services. They amount to a total of $22 billion in 2005. The second portion
of the services liberalization experiment is based on protection estimates that are highly
speculative. However, the trade and transport sector to which these rates apply represent a very
large share of global trade in services and are therefore very important. Here the potential gains
are very large indeed, as indicated by the estimated global gain of $332 billion in 2005. Clearly
accurately modeling restrictions on trade and investment in these services sectors should be a
high priority for future research.
V. Summary and Conclusions
The objective of this study was to evaluate the implications of agricultural and non-
agricultural liberalization on the farm and food economy and global welfare. Our approach,
based on a modified version of the GTAP model of global trade, takes into account the dramatic
changes in the pattern of trade since the lead-up to the Uruguay Round. Furthermore, we have
developed projections of the global economy to the year 2005, when the UR is to be fully
implemented. Of particular note is the continuing decline in developing countries’ food export
share as a consequence of limited progress, relative to manufactures liberalization under the
Uruguay Round. Our analysis of liberalization is conducted in the wake of our projections to
2005, and involves 40% cuts in protection in agriculture, mining and manufacturing, as well as
services.
We find that agricultural liberalization in the wake of the Uruguay Round could still yield
substantial benefits for the global economy in 2005. The total gains amount to about $70 billion
for 40% cuts in both market price support and domestic producer subsidies. These gains shrink to
$60 billion if domestic subsidies are left unaltered. Overall, these welfare improvements are
comparable to the gains that could be obtained from similar cuts in manufacturing tariffs.
However, as Hertel and Martin (1999) have pointed out, the distribution of these gains is quite
different. In the case of manufacturing tariff cuts, the developing countries make the biggest cuts
in protection (i.e. initial tariffs are higher), but they also enjoy the lion’s share of the gains. In the
case of agricultural liberalization, the rates of protection are highest in the industrialized
economies and they are the ones to capture the majority of the absolute gains from liberalization
of food markets. However, when measured relative to initial income, developing countries are
also some of the biggest winners from cuts in agricultural protection.
We also examine the interaction between non-agricultural reforms and agricultural trade
balances, by region. Overall, reductions in agricultural protection have the strongest impact on
the regional food trade balances. However, for some regions, most notably Southeast Asia and
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parts of South Asia, as well as the Middle East and North Africa, non-agricultural reforms
actually dominate and reverse the sign of the change in food trade balance following
liberalization. In the case of China, manufacturing tariff cuts are equally as important as
agricultural liberalization in determining the change in China’s food trade balance. Both sets of
multilateral reforms lead to a substantial decline in China’s aggregate food trade balance, and
when combined, the total decline is approximately $6 billion in 2005.
All of the estimates in this study should be viewed as preliminary and subject to revision as
improved estimates of protection become available. There are several areas which require
immediate attention. Agricultural protection in non-OECD countries is very poorly documented
at present. It is hoped that the recent collaborative initiative between Agriculture Canada, the
European Commission, the OECD, the USDA/ERS, and UNCTAD will rectify this. With regard
to the OECD countries, more work is needed on the appropriate representation of “decoupled”
policies in this type of quantitative framework. Some progress has already been made along
these lines (Frandsen and Bach, 1998). In addition, the explicit modeling of tariff rate quotas will
be an important item for future analysis, since the distribution of the associated rents will become
increasing important (Elbehri, et al., 1999). Finally, while we have reported on some innovative
work aimed at coming to grips with services protection, much more research along these lines
will be needed in order to understand the implications of services liberalization. It is important,
not only for services trade, but also for the food and agricultural sector. The latter are
increasingly dependent on services as a production input, as well as a mechanism for
transporting, and adding value to, food products.
17
References
Abbott, P. and B. A. Morse. 1999. "TRQ Implementation in Developing Countries, to be
presented at the199 Global Conference on Agriculture and the New Trade Agenda from a
Development Perspective; Interests and Options in the WTO 2000  Negotiations
Sponsored by the World Bank and WTO, Geneva October 1-2.
Ahuja, V. and D. Filmer. 1995. "Educational Attainment in Developing Countries: New
Estimates and Projections Disaggregated by Gender," World Bank Policy Research
Working Paper 1489, Washington, DC, July.
Anderson, K., B. Dimaranan, T. Hertel and W. Martin. 1997. Asia-Pacific Food Markets and
Trade in 2005: A Global, Economy-Wide Perspective", Australian Journal of
Agricultural and Resource Economics 41(1): 19-44, March.
Arndt, C. T. Hertel, B. Dimaranan, K. Huff, and R. McDougall. 1997. "China in 2005:
Implications for the Rest of the World," Journal of Economic Integration (12):505-547.
Bernard, A. and C. Jones. 1996. "Productivity Growth Across Industries And Countries: Time
Series Theory And Evidence," Review of Economics and Statistics LXXVIII(1):135-46.
Brown, D., A.V. Deardorff, A.K. Fox, and R.M. Stern. 1996. "Computational Analysis of Goods
and Services Liberalization in the Uruguay Round," ," in Martin, W. and Winters, L. A.
eds. The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, Cambridge University Press..
Coyle, W., Gehler, M., Hertel, T.W., Wang. Z., and Yu, W. 1998. “Understanding the
Determinants of Structural Change in World Food Markets,” American Journal of
Agricultural Economics, 80(5): 1051-1061.
Elbehri, A., M. Ingco, T. Hertel and K. Pearson. 1999. "Agricultural Liberalization in the New
Millennium," paper to be presented at the World Bank conference on Agriculture and the
New Trade Agenda from a Development Perspective, Geneva, 1-2 October.
Francois, J. 1998. "Scale Economies and Imperfect Competition in the GTAP Model," GTAP
Technical Paper Number 14, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University,
www.agecon.purdue.edu/gtap/techpapr.
Francois, J. 1999. "A Gravity Approach to Measuring Services Protection". Unpublished
manuscript, Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Francois, J. and Strutt, A. 1999. "Post Uruguay Round Tariff Vectors for GTAP Version 4,"
Mimeo, Global Trade Analysis Project, Purdue University, West Lafayette.
Frandsen, S. and C. Bach.  1998. "European Integration and the Common Agricultural Policy,"
SJFI Working Paper No. 1/98.
18
Gehlhar, M. J. 1997. "Historical Analysis Of Growth And Trade Patterns In The Pacific Rim: An
Evaluation Of The GTAP Framework," chapter 14 in T.W. Hertel (ed.) Global Trade
Analysis: Modeling and Applications, Cambridge University Press
Gehlhar, M., T. Hertel. and W. Martin. 1994, "Economic Growth And The Changing Structure
Of Trade And Production In The Pacific Rim," American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 76(December):1101-1110.
Grilli, E. and M. Yang. 1988. "Primary Commodity Prices, Manufactured Goods Prices, And
The Terms Of Trade Of Developing Countries: What The Long Run Shows," World
Bank Economic Review 2(1):
Harrison, W J and K. R. Pearson. 1996. “Computing Solutions For Large General Equilibrium
Models Using GEMPACK”, Computational Economics 9:83-127.
Hathaway, D.E. and M.D. Ingco. 1995.  Agricultural Liberalization and the Uruguay Round," ,"
in Martin, W. and Winters, L. A. eds. The Uruguay Round and the Developing
Economies, World Bank Discussion Paper 307, World Bank, Washington DC.
Hertel, T. W. 1994. “The Procompetitive Effects of Trade Policy Reform in a Small, Open
Economy”, Journal of International Economics 36:391-411.
Hertel, T.W. (ed.) 1997. Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Hertel, T.W., and W. Martin. 1999. "Developing Country Interests in Liberalizing Manufactures
Trade," paper presented at the World Bank's Conference on Developing Countries and
the Millennium Round, WTO Secretariat, Geneva, 19-20 September.
Hertel, T.W., W. Martin, K. Yanagishima and B. Dimaranan. 1996. "Liberalizing Manufactures
Trade in a Changing World Economy," in The Uruguay Round and the Developing
Countries, edited by W. Martin and A. Winters, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hoekman, B. 1995. "Assessing the General Agreement on Trade in Services," in Martin, W. and
Winters, L. A. eds. The Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies, World Bank
Discussion Paper 307, World Bank, Washington DC.
Ingco, M.D. 1996. "Tariffication in the Uruguay Round: How Much Liberalization?" The World
Economy 19(4): 425-47, July.
Johnson, D. G. 1973.  World Agriculture in Disarray, New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Josling, T., S. Tangermann and T.K. Warley. 1996. Agriculture in the GATT, London:
Macmillan and New York: St Martin's Press.
Laird, S. 1999. "Patterns Of Protection And Approaches To Liberalization," paper presented to
CEPR Workshop on "New Issues in the World Trading System", Centre for Economic
Policy Research, London.
19
Liu, J., T.C. Arndt, and T. W. Hertel. 2000. "Estimating Trade Elasticities for Use in Global,
General Equilibrium Analysis”, paper submitted to the 2000 Conference on Empirical
Investigations in International Economics, University of Colorado, Boulder.
McDougall, R.A., A. Elbehri, and T.P. Truong. 1998. Global Trade Assistance and Protection:
The GTAP 4 Data Base, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Purdue University.
Srinivasan, T. N., J. Whalley, and I.Wooton. 1993. "Measuring The Effects Of Regionalism On
Trade And Welfare," in Anderson, K. and R. Blackhurst, (eds.), Regional Integration and
the Global Trading System, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London.
Tyers, R. and K. Anderson. 1992. Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assessment,
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
20














































Figure 2.  B
ulk/N































































Table 1. Structure of the Global Economy in 1995: Comparison between Agriculture, Manufactures and Services
Region  Consumption share Value-added share Share in region's exports Exports/Output  Imports/Usage
Food Mnfcs Svces Food Mnfcs Svces Food Mnfcs Svces Food Mnfcs Svces Food Mnfcs Svces
NAmerica 0.085 0.169 0.746 0.047 0.226 0.727 0.081 0.684 0.235 0.088 0.175 0.028 0.063 0.221 0.019
WEurope 0.128 0.213 0.658 0.055 0.233 0.711 0.086 0.696 0.218 0.172 0.340 0.051 0.190 0.346 0.041
AusNZL 0.124 0.144 0.732 0.070 0.163 0.767 0.271 0.465 0.264 0.299 0.233 0.045 0.071 0.351 0.041
Japan 0.157 0.138 0.705 0.052 0.243 0.705 0.005 0.846 0.149 0.003 0.131 0.013 0.094 0.089 0.020
China 0.461 0.296 0.243 0.225 0.355 0.420 0.052 0.848 0.100 0.038 0.199 0.035 0.051 0.195 0.029
Taiwan 0.175 0.183 0.641 0.047 0.297 0.656 0.032 0.884 0.085 0.087 0.438 0.041 0.188 0.377 0.062
OthNICs 0.259 0.250 0.491 0.093 0.266 0.640 0.021 0.669 0.310 0.047 0.389 0.142 0.166 0.466 0.083
Indonesia 0.407 0.141 0.452 0.228 0.300 0.472 0.131 0.753 0.117 0.088 0.364 0.039 0.065 0.358 0.049
OthSEA 0.234 0.352 0.414 0.181 0.357 0.462 0.143 0.654 0.203 0.223 0.471 0.146 0.156 0.580 0.123
India 0.445 0.231 0.325 0.301 0.223 0.477 0.156 0.697 0.146 0.040 0.140 0.025 0.026 0.215 0.024
OthSoAsia 0.439 0.264 0.297 0.312 0.209 0.479 0.121 0.711 0.169 0.049 0.233 0.049 0.124 0.414 0.060
Brazil 0.249 0.292 0.459 0.125 0.225 0.650 0.254 0.605 0.141 0.064 0.068 0.011 0.033 0.110 0.017
OthLatAm 0.253 0.258 0.489 0.194 0.276 0.530 0.257 0.531 0.212 0.144 0.181 0.057 0.069 0.273 0.048
Turkey 0.311 0.234 0.455 0.198 0.182 0.620 0.098 0.449 0.452 0.067 0.203 0.119 0.080 0.327 0.033
OthMENA 0.288 0.212 0.500 0.108 0.363 0.529 0.033 0.812 0.155 0.043 0.320 0.050 0.181 0.316 0.069
EIT 0.234 0.264 0.502 0.097 0.308 0.595 0.075 0.694 0.231 0.080 0.219 0.061 0.136 0.223 0.050
SoAfrCU 0.239 0.237 0.524 0.082 0.266 0.652 0.097 0.703 0.200 0.096 0.252 0.040 0.082 0.292 0.042
OthSSA 0.429 0.242 0.329 0.303 0.283 0.414 0.233 0.594 0.172 0.134 0.230 0.067 0.087 0.293 0.071
ROW 0.274 0.358 0.369 0.203 0.296 0.501 0.119 0.582 0.299 0.046 0.131 0.056 0.110 0.273 0.043
World 0.156 0.196 0.648 0.074 0.244 0.682 0.082 0.707 0.211 0.096 0.238 0.040 0.114 0.257 0.033
Source: McDougall et al, 1998
Notes: Consumption share refers to private household consumption at producers' prices. Therefore, wholesale/retail/transport margins are not included.
Table 2.  Elasticities of Substitution between Domestic and Imported Goods
Commodity GTAP This Study Liu et al*
foodgrains 2.2 4..4 4.1
foodgrains 2.2 4.4 4.1
oilseeds 2.2 4.4 4.1
meatlstk 2.5 5 6.5
dairy 2.4 4.8 6.5
othagr 2.2 4.4 4.1
othfood 2.2 4.4 6.5
bevtobac 3.1 6.2 6.5
extract 2.8 5.6 1.0
textiles 2.2 4.4 4.1
wearapp 4.4 8.8 4.1
woodpaper 2.15 4.3 4.7
pchemineral 2.05 4.1 3.3
metals 2.8 5.6 2.5
autos 5.2 10.4 6.3
electronics 2.8 5.6 4.7
othmnfcs 3.25 6.5 4.7
houseutils 2.35 4.7 n/a
tradetrans 1.9 3.8 n/a
construction 1.9 3.8 n/a
busfinance 1.9 3.8 n/a
goveservice 1.9 3.8 n/a
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Table 3.  Cumulative Percentage Growth Rates over the Period 1995-2000








































































































































































































































































* The low, medium, high, and very high growth assumptions for total factor productivity (TFP) in manufacturing correspond to
annual growth rates of 0.3%, 1%, 2%, and 3%, respectively. TFP growth in other sectors is based on a proportion of this rate. These
proportions are: 1.4 (agriculture), 0.5 (services) and 0.0 (mining).
Table 4. Average Rates of Protection, by Region and Sector, 2005
 Region Food Extract Mnfcs Constr BusFin Trd&Trn GovSvces
NAmerica 5 0 3 10 8 69 34
WEurope 8 0 1 18 9 84 40
AusNZL 4 0 7 24 7 91 31
Japan 58 0 2 30 20 71 32
China 18 3 20 41 19 96 42
Taiwan 41 3 4 5 3 93 36
OthNICs 21 2 2 10 2 82 37
Indonesia 5 0 8 10 7 85 43
OthSEA 25 2 12 18 5 88 40
India 40 3 35 62 13 96 41
OthSoAsia 37 19 20 46 20 92 41
Brazil 4 1 16 57 36 71 44
OthLatAm 9 7 10 26 5 79 43
Turkey 31 0 6 46 20 92 40%
OthMENA 15 9 14 10 4 92 40%
EIT 12 2 9 52 18 71 35%
SoAfrCU 8 0 8 42 16 58 26%
OthSSA 13 9 9 11 0 94 43%
ROW 76 21 33 46 20 97 38%
Table 5. Average Protection (percent ad valorem) for Food and
Agriculture, By Sector,  Worldwide, 2005
 Import Tariff Export Subsidy Production Subsidy
foodgrains 23 1 6
feedgrains 97 4 11
oilseeds 4 0 9
meatlstk 17 8 2
dairy 23 27 2
othagr 11 0 0
othfood 1 0 0
bevtobac 18 0 0
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Table 6. Change in World Trade Volume (percent change)
Commodity  Experiment  
 AgrMkt40 Agr40 Emnfc40 Svces40
foodgrains 1.9 -7.2 1.2 0.5
feedgrains 4.1 1 0.7 0.5
oilseeds 0.6 5.8 0.1 0.3
meatlstk 5.6 4.9 1.1 0.3
dairy -6.7 -6.9 0.1 0.7
othagr 8.3 8.1 0.5 0.4
othfood 12.1 11.8 0.5 -0.1
bevtobac 27.5 27.6 0 0.8
extract 0 -0.1 1.8 0.3
textiles 0.2 0.2 16.3 0.3
wearapp 0.7 0.4 22.3 0.6
woodpaper 0 0 3.6 0.4
pchemineral 0 -0.1 4.6 0.6
metals 0 0 5.5 0.4
autos 0.3 0.5 9.4 0.9
electronics 0.1 0.1 4.1 -0.1
othmnfcs 0.1 0.2 5.2 0.2
houseutils 0 0 0.1 1
tradetrans 0.5 0.5 1.5 59.8
construction 0.3 0.5 0.4 18.3
busfinance 0.1 0.1 0.5 10.8
govservice -0.1 -0.1 0.8 39.2
Table 8. Welfare and Efficiency Gains due to 40% Liberalization in Agriculture: 2005
 Agr40 experiment ratios (percentages)  Total EV by experiment ($mill.)  
Region Eff/$VA Eff/EV EV/Exp  Agr40 AgrMkt40 Emnfc40 BusFinSvces T&Tsvces
NAmerica 9 11 0.035 3401 1436 3310 4517 52532
WEurope 6 104 0.369 36959 27810 8180 8532 128593
AusNZL 6 -12 0.377 1786 1348 207 209 8421
Japan 6 120 0.253 12552 13461 6607 2564 33358
China 6 1067 0.012 172 753 22593 826 8710
Taiwan 4 143 0.060 265 295 3288 83 6072
OthNICs 3 115 0.333 2672 2996 5270 612 23228
Indonesia 2 1183 0.002 6 26 792 270 1474
OthSEA 2 101 0.465 1931 1247 2631 393 11092
India 1 137 0.200 1058 927 3084 19 3989
OthSoAsia 1 118 0.852 1176 1181 1645 9 2213
Brazil 1 64 0.245 1988 1683 4491 457 3625
OthLatAm 1 48 0.360 3055 2366 1449 652 8611
Turkey 1 123 0.142 338 332 619 70 3524
OthMENA 0 -15 -0.202 -1506 -718 1074 231 16667
EIT 0 142 0.033 301 282 1391 1865 10265
SoAfrCU 0 46 0.080 129 54 283 128 1897
OthSSA 0 31 0.194 436 529 249 30 4496
ROW -1 115 0.741 2601 2611 2399 137 3798
World    69320 58619 69564 21604 332565
 Appendix
Definition of Sectors and Regions
As discussed in the text, we base our analysis on the version 4 GTAP database (McDougall et
al., 1998). Appendix tables A2 and A3 detail the mapping between our aggregate regions and
commodities and those in the GTAP database. Table A1 shows the grouping into “high-income”
and “developing” economies used for expository purposes in places in this paper.
Revision of Version 4 Protection Data
In addition, a number of important adjustments were made to the version 4, GTAP database
prior to implementation of the baseline simulation described in the body of this paper. Protection
data in the GTAP version 4 database was modified to reflect more recent agricultural protection
data for selected, non-OECD countries  by drawing on recent work done by David Vanzetti of
the Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics. Vanzetti undertook a survey of
other available data including the UNCTAD TRAINS database, the APEC tariff database, and
WTO notifications from member countries. Based on his comparison of other protection data
with the protection rates in the GTAP database, import tariffs were significantly reduced for
Korea (rice, wheat, and milk), Malaysia and the Philippines (rice, wheat, sugar, beef, and milk),
Thailand (wheat, beef, and milk) and India (wheat). Tariff rates were increased for China
(sugarcane, sugar beet and sugar), and disprotection of grains products (import subsidies implied
by domestic prices below world prices) was eliminated, Taiwan and Korea (beef), Philippines
(sugar), and Brazil (rice, wheat, maize and cotton).
Export subsidy data in the version 4 database for non-OECD countries were based on
protection estimates from the pre-Uruguay Round period, adjusted for changes in the OECD
countries. Using information from notifications to the WTO on export subsidy expenditures,
agricultural export subsidy equivalents for coarse grains, wheat, beef, and dairy products in
Korea, and the ASEAN countries were removed from the database. Output subsidies on paddy
rice in Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines and for wheat and sugarcane in South Africa were
also removed from the database. In the case of China, where export subsidy-equivalents are
widespread (including non-agriculture), based on estimates by the contributing authors for that
database, we eliminated all such interventions. Our reasoning was that these taxes and subsidies,
which feature very large in our analysis, were based on price comparisons which may not be
accurate.
All of the new tax rates were attained via use of the ALTERTAX tool (Malcolm, 1998)
which targets the revised tax rates while at the same time seeking to preserve the value flows in
the database.
Estimates of post-Uruguay Round tariff rates were obtained from work done by Francois
and Strutt (1999) which drew on information from the GTAP version 3 database and the
GATT/WTO integrated database (IDB).  Due to some spurious results for beverages and
tobacco, the Francois/Strutt estimates of post-UR tariff rates for beverages and tobacco were
amended by applying the same percentage price cuts from pre- to post-UR in the version 3
database to the pre-UR rates in version 4.
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Appendix Table A1. List of 19 regions used in this analysis
High-income countries
Namerica ..................................  & North America






OthNICs ...................................& Other NICs
Indonesia ..................................& Indonesia
OthSEA ....................................& Other Southeast Asia
India..........................................& India
OthSoAsia ................................& Other South Asia
Brazil ........................................& Brazil
OthLatAm.................................  & Other Latin America
Turkey ......................................& Turkey
OthMENA ................................  & Other M East and N Africa
EIT............................................& Economies in Transition
SoAfrCU ..................................& South Africa Customs Union
OthSSA ....................................& Other Sub-saharan Africa
ROW .......................................& All other regions
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Table A2. Mapping from GTAP's (version 4) 45 Regions into the 19 Regional Groupings used in
this Analysis
aus ..........................Australia......................................................................................& AusNZL
nzl ........................New Zealand...............................................................................& WEurope
swe..........................Sweden .......................................................................................& WEurope
fin ...........................Finland ........................................................................................& WEurope
reu...........................Rest of European Union .............................................................& WEurope
eft............................EFTA ..........................................................................................& WEurope
cea ..........................Central European Associates ......................................................& EIT
fsu...........................Former Soviet Union ..................................................................& EIT
tur ...........................Turkey.........................................................................................& Turkey
rme..........................Rest of Middle East ....................................................................& OthMENA
mar..........................Morocco......................................................................................& OthMENA
rnf ...........................Rest of North Africa ...................................................................& OthMENA
saf ...........................South African Customs Union....................................................& SoAfrCU
rsa ...........................Rest of southern Africa...............................................................& OthSSA
rss ...........................Rest of sub-Saharan Africa.........................................................& OthSSA
row..........................Rest of World..............................................................................& ROW
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Table A3. Description of the 22 sectors used in this Analysis
Agriculture
Foodgrains..................................... &rice, wheat, coarse grains and
Feedgrains ..................................... & coarse grains
Oilseeds......................................... & oilseeds
Meatlstk ........................................ & ruminants and non-ruminants and processed meats dairy& dairy
Othagr ........................................... & other farm products
Othfood ......................................... & other processed foods
Bevtobac ....................................... & beverages and tobacco
Minerals and energy
Extract ......................................& mining, fish, forestry
Manufactures
Textiles .....................................& textiles
Wearapp ...................................& wearing apparel
Woodpaper ...............................& wood and paper products
Pchemineral..............................& petcoal, crp, nmm
Metals.......................................& metals and metal products
Autos ........................................& motor vehicles and parts
Electronics................................& electronic equipment
Othmnfcs ..................................oth trans equipment, mach and equipment, other mnfcs
Services
Houseutils.................................& housing and utilities
tradetrans ..................................& trade and transport services
construction ..............................& construction services
busfinance ................................& business and financial service
govservice ................................& government services
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